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Abstract 
 
In the European Union, the infrastructure charging regimes that can be observed are often far from 
internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency principles. In this situation differentiation of 
existing charges appears to be a sensible intermediate step. 
In this paper we study the empirical evidence of the different aspects that affect infrastructure pricing 
as described by theory. In order to do so information was collected from a number of case studies, and a 
set of indicators was defined, not only to allow for the analysis of price differentiation practise with 
respect to the degree of differentiation, but also to account for the level of ambition of the price setting 
actors. 
The cross-case analysis was based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical 
framework. Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information allowed us to establish an 
overview of the current state of differentiated infrastructure charging. 
 
Keywords: Price differentiation; Infrastructure; Special interest groups; Normative economics; Positive 
economics. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the European Union, levels and structures of transport infrastructure charges vary 
strongly across transport modes and countries. Some degree of convergence exists on 
the intention to apply the principle of marginal cost pricing in various transport sectors, 
but, in the presence of unsolved difficulties in funding transport investment and even 
serious concerns about marginal social cost pricing in several countries, any such 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Jasper Knockaert (jknockaert@feweb.vu.nl) 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 4-34 
 5 
convergence is slow. At present, the charging regimes that can be observed are often far 
from internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency principles. 
In this situation differentiation of existing charges appears to be a sensible 
intermediate step. A possible way to increase the efficiency of pricing structures would 
be to take existing structures as a starting point and try to increase their efficiency by 
making them more differentiated. This may, however, lead to a number of questions 
such as: how differentiated should these price structures be in order to lead to efficiency 
gains, how will users react, what are the effects on equity and revenues, etc. The effects 
on revenues deserve particular emphasis here, because in many countries plans exist to 
replace the existing system of taxed based infrastructure financing with a system based 
on user charges. 
Economic theory has brought us an ample set of considerations with respect to 
differentiated prices. Pigou showed already in 1920 in his economic analysis of road 
pricing and congestion costs that a levy equal to the marginal external costs should be 
levied in order to correct for suboptimal behaviour of individual road users. Over the 
decades, scholars have elaborated on behavioural, technical, political, and many other 
impacts on the optimal form of differentiated infrastructure prices. 
In this paper we study the empirical evidence of the different factors that affect 
infrastructure pricing as described by theory. In order to do so information was collected 
from a number of case studies that were conducted in the DIFFERENT project. The 
case studies concern both real world implementations as well as desk based research of 
the introduction of differentiated infrastructure charges. A cross case analysis allows us 
to identify how key aspects of the theory of price differentiation are dealt with in the 
setting of actual implementations. 
The theoretical framework that we use as a basis for our study is represented in 
figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Analytical framework. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 4-34 
 6 
Figure 1 identifies five different factors that affect price differentiation. The left-hand 
side of the framework gives three (normative) arguments which may explain differences 
in price setting: objectives among infrastructure managers and operators may be 
different, with economic theory focussing on the role of economic efficiency and equity. 
Also the implications of the particular cost structure of the transport industry for pricing 
are being studied, as well as the demand of the infrastructure user. 
But there are also other issues that are relevant for user charge differentiation. Policy 
makers may well affect price setting in transport. This is where the positive branch of 
economic theory of price differentiation comes in (at the top of figure 1). The normative 
approach assumes that all politicians or regulators maximize welfare, but, at the same 
time, they may also pursue their own goals (e.g. re-election). Consequently, interest 
groups can have substantial influence on them. Considerations like these are of 
particular relevance as they may considerably affect the differentiation of user charges. 
Finally also practical issues are important (in the middle of figure 1). For instance, a 
highly differentiated first best pricing scheme may have large implementation costs, if 
technically feasible at all. A high degree of sophistication also implies significant 
decision costs for the infrastructure user. We refer to the GRACE project for more 
information on the appropriate degree of complexity in transport charges (see e.g. 
Bonsall, et al., 2006). Moreover, in an economy suggesting that less variety is 
sometimes better (Norwood, 2006), more choices (a consequence of a higher degree of 
differentiation) may also lead to more search costs.  
In order to conduct our cross case analysis we needed to collect information in a 
consistent form. To do so a fact sheet was completed for all case studies. These case 
studies were drawn from the DIFFERENT project. The DIFFERENT research project 
was carried out from 2006 through 2008 in the 6th Framework Programme of the EU 
Commission. The objective of the project was to improve the understanding of user 
reactions to differentiated infrastructure prices in order to determine efficient charging 
schemes for infrastructure use. The project investigated user reactions to differentiated 
pricing through empirical as well as inter-related theoretical work. The empirical work 
encompassed real world case studies, as well as stated and revealed preference research. 
The scope of the theoretical work included normative and positive economic theory, and 
behavioural theory. 
Furthermore, a set of indicators was defined in order to analyse price differentiation 
practise with respect to the degree of differentiation as well as to account for the level of 
ambition of the price setting actors. 
The cross-case analysis was based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from 
the theoretical framework. Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information 
allowed us to establish an overview of the current state of differentiated infrastructure 
charging. 
 
 
2. Economic theory 
 
Economic theory provides a contribution to differentiated infrastructure pricing along 
two main lines. The first contribution concerns the formulation of the optimal 
framework (the normative approach) for transport charges differentiation. This 
framework can be determined by pursuing economic efficiency, a concept derived from 
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welfare economics, according to which transport charges (prices) should be equal to 
marginal social costs in order to obtain maximum social welfare. According to this 
theory, prices should be equal to marginal social costs (throughout the economy) in 
order to achieve this goal. 
The positive economic theory of price differentiation examines price differentiation 
from a different point of view: politicians are no longer assumed to be benevolent 
welfare maximisers, they are pursuing their own goals. So, instead of maximizing 
collective utility, they tend to maximize individual utility, in particular since they want 
to be re-elected. This makes decision makers dependent on interest groups. 
Departing from the axiom of welfare maximization means that the question of how 
transport prices are actually set under real world conditions is more relevant than the 
question of how transport pricing should be set. How this affects pricing-regulation has 
been demonstrated in the past in a long series of models (Stigler, Becker, Keeler, 
Posner, Grossman-Helpman). In this part of the analysis of our paper we go one step 
further and examine the way in which the interaction between Special Interest Groups 
(SIGs) and decision makers is reflected in the adopted structures of transport pricing. 
This change of perspective from normative to positive theory does not mean that the 
two approaches have no connection (in the sense of two different “schools” of economic 
theory or the like). First, many cases exist where both approaches make the same 
predictions, and second, every policy-maker needs to take normative considerations into 
account, if he wants to be re-elected (von Weizsäcker, 1982). In other words, the two 
approaches are complementary, or one may also say that one is a special case of the 
other, depending on perspective. 
 
2.1. Normative economics 
 
In this subsection we will introduce a selection of topics relating to price setting actors 
maximising welfare. The format is that of capita selecta. For a more extended 
introduction we refer to the literature or the project report. 
 
Efficiency: marginal social cost pricing 
 
The concept of economic efficiency is derived from the theory of welfare economics, 
and is related to the allocation of resources in an economy. Welfare economics takes a 
rather wide view of pricing, considering pricing as a method of resource allocation, 
maximising social welfare rather than simply the welfare of the supplier (Button, 1993). 
According to this view, prices should equal marginal social cost in order to maximise 
social welfare. By pricing at marginal cost, in effect, transport services are being 
provided up to the point where the benefit for the marginal unit is equal to the costs of 
providing that unit (Button, 1993). In some cases, private provision of the good or 
service may also result in maximising the social welfare. If not, regulatory policies may 
be formulated so that private companies will change their pricing policy , so that social, 
rather than private welfare, is maximised. 
A market equilibrium under this optimal pricing rule only can exist under a stringent 
set of conditions. Clearly, this equilibrium will not exist in reality. This makes first-best 
pricing very much a theoretical result, which is often used as a benchmark for other, 
more realistic, pricing approaches. 
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The transport market is characterised by several market imperfections which makes it 
very unlikely that the market, without regulation, will set transport prices equal to 
marginal social costs and, therefore, social welfare will not be optimised. Besides 
market failures, governments may also have other reasons to intervene and adjust prices. 
Equity is an important reason that deserves attention in the context of price 
differentiation. 
 
Constraints in transport pricing 
 
Social marginal cost pricing assumes a theoretical first-best world. Such first-best 
pricing is increasingly recognised as being of limited practical relevance, but it might 
serve as a useful theoretical benchmark. Besides the previously described reasons for 
market failures, various constraints and barriers may exist that prevent a regulator from 
charging (optimal) prices that it ideally would prefer. Verhoef (2002) mentions the 
following important constraints: 
 
- Technological and practical constraints: first-best pricing requires charges that 
vary continuously over time, place, route chosen, type of vehicle, driving style etc, 
which might be too sophisticated and not understood by drivers or impossible to 
implement under available charging technologies; 
- Acceptability constraints; there may be too much resistance and uncertainty (e.g. 
about objective and necessity of the measure) that may make it preferable to start 
with a few small-scale demonstration projects; 
- Institutional constraints; one example is where local or regional governments 
cannot affect some transport charges that are set by a higher level government; 
- Legal constraints; ideal prices might not be possible on the basis of legal 
arguments (e.g. when taxes should be predictable) 
- Financial constraints; for instance the prior definition of minimum or maximum 
tax revenue sums to be collected; 
- Market interaction constraints; transport taxes will have many consequences for 
other markets, among the most important is the labour market; 
- Political constraints: charges may become a political issue much more than an 
economic question. 
 
Under such conditions, the regulator has to resort to second-best pricing: setting the 
prices that are available optimally, under the existing constraints. 
 
Equity 
 
Finally, transportation often raises equity concerns that seem to conflict with marginal 
cost pricing. Marginal cost pricing may result in very differentiated charges with the 
consequence that no one transport user pays the same price; this may be perceived as 
unfair. Equity is important in the context of acceptability of pricing. Many stakeholders 
raise objections about pricing measures that they perceive as unfair. If a pricing measure 
is unfair either to themselves in relation to other people or to people who are considered 
to be less well off in society, significant acceptability problems could occur. Transport 
pricing is often perceived as a form of regressive taxation, allowing only those with 
enough money to access a resource (e.g. infrastructure) that was once considered free. 
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Implementation strategies that allow certain groups within a community to be exempted 
from pricing, or compensate some groups with a lump-sum transfer are therefore 
discussed. The problem of who should receive extra benefits (e.g. tax exemption) and 
the wider problem of making sure price measures are both equitable and perceived to be 
so, are important issues to be included in any successful implementation strategy. Then, 
price discrimination becomes relevant. In public transport, for instance, it is common 
that different prices are charged for the same service. Particular groups in society, e.g. 
the elderly, may benefit from the fare policy of governments . 
The public finance and tax literature makes a distinction between horizontal equity 
and vertical equity. Horizontal equity refers to the principle which states that those who 
are in identical or similar circumstances should pay identical or similar amounts in taxes 
(Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000). It requires that those with equal status - whether measured 
by ability or some other appropriate scale - should be treated the same. If, for instance, 
income were the only measure of a person, then two persons with equal incomes would 
be treated as equals. Vertical equity states that people who are better off should pay 
more taxes (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000). This generally requires that those with less 
ability to pay are treated favourably relative to those with greater ability. 
 
User responses 
 
People's responses to transport pricing are not straightforward. Price increases may 
not necessarily lead to trip suppression, it may also induce travellers to change their 
modal use or change their departure time, depending on the type of measure. A wide 
variety of transport pricing measures exists, having different consequences for travel 
behaviour. Price measures are considered as one of the major tools for policy-makers to 
influence transport development. The design of measures will generally depend on the 
objectives. 
The response of infrastructure users will to a considerable extent depend on the exact 
design of the pricing scheme (e.g. a yearly tax on car ownership can be expected to 
affect kilometrage of a given vehicle relatively weakly, compared to a kilometre 
charge). Equally important, however, is the price sensitivity (often expressed as 
elasticities by economists) of transport users for the various relevant types of user 
reactions that together define transport behaviour. People have various possibilities to 
change transport behaviour, and can be expected to react differently to different pricing 
schemes. The possible outcomes (in terms of behavioural responses) of pricing can be 
the following: 
 
- Trip suppression (travel frequency choice); 
- Departure time choice (and scheduling of daily activities); 
- Different route choice; 
- Changes in modal split; 
- Changes in vehicle occupancy; 
- Spatial choices related to relocation; 
- Change in driving style (e.g. speed choice); 
- Vehicle ownership; 
- Technology choice; 
- Changes in destination choice; 
- Class choice (for public transport). 
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Elasticities can provide indicative and useful answers to the questions on the 
effectiveness of policy measures. However, policy makers must realise that no unique 
value of the elasticity of one particular measure does exist. Elasticities of travel demand 
will vary with circumstances and very much depend on the context. Relevant 
circumstances include geographical scale of the study, the short-term or long-term, 
existing price levels and alternatives, and the composition of the population. The types 
of change in travel times and costs might also be relevant (e.g. small or big change, 
increase or decrease, and gradual or drastic change). This makes it difficult to compare 
and interpret different elasticities. Comparison of elasticities only is useful when a clear 
description of the dependent and independent variables (which price changes and which 
demand is affected) exists. 
 
2.2. Positive economics 
 
This part of the analysis first gives a brief overview of the positive economic theory 
of regulation.1 Subsequently, the positive approach will be linked to transport pricing. 
Finally, the dimensions of price differentiation will be presented. 
To start with the existence of Special Interest Groups (SIGs), Noll (1989) states that 
the reason for the existence of SIGs is mainly due to the lack of power of single voters 
and the desire to control politicians. To solve the problem of lack of power, voters can 
unite in SIGs which represent their political preferences better than the simple voting 
process. Also the costs of influencing and controlling politicians’ activities are far too 
high for a single person, but not for a whole group pursuing the same interests where 
costs can be distributed over all members of the SIG. However, SIGs often face the 
problem of free riding. Olson (1965) notes in this respect that small and well organized 
interest groups are more efficient in lobbying because the free rider problem is much 
smaller. 
To motivate the use of the positive theory of regulation in this paper it is necessary to 
give a brief historical overview of the emergence of the positive economic literature. In 
the 60s more and more economists observed that decision makers failed to regulate 
industries effectively. In fact, regulation in many markets served the interests of the 
industry it was supposed to regulate. The initiating empirical study by Stigler and 
Friedland (Stigler and Friedland, 1962) that mainly resulted in the Stigler/Peltzmann 
model and other theories on regulatory capture gained acceptance among economists in 
the 70s. The main proposition of these models is that regulators gain from supplying 
regulation and industries gain from regulation through restriction of competition. The 
underlying assumption is that consumers are not well organized and informed but 
producers can form small but well organized interest groups. 
Thus, the widely known Stigler/Peltzmann Model assumes that decision makers 
maximize their political support (political support is assumed to be a function of 
industry profits and the respective price). In the equilibrium politicians will impose 
regulations on unregulated industries or partly deregulate completely regulated 
industries. Although at present much deeper positive economic models exist, the 
Stigler/Peltzmann economic contribution comprises a result, which has proven to be 
robust in most models of this type: The outcome of the political process is a 
compromise between total regulation and total deregulation. 
                                                 
1
 An overview of political economy can for instance be found in Noll (1989). 
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The next major contribution in the positive economic theory was provided by Gary 
Becker (Becker, 1983, 1985). Becker extended the above mentioned models by 
incorporating the idea that more than one SIG (with partially conflicting interests) 
influences the political process. According to Becker, regulation thus occurs as a result 
of battling SIGs. Becker ignores the politician’s own preferences. However the outcome 
of his model comprises a politician’s decision, in which all SIGs preferences are (at 
least partly) incorporated. In the equilibrium the regulator implements a policy which is 
a weighted sum of the involved SIGs’ preferences. Several researchers (Tullock, 1971) 
dealt with this topic from a different point of view: SIGs know that policy makers have 
the power to distribute rents resulting from regulation and will therefore compete for 
these rents. Due to the existence of rent-seeking behaviour, only one SIG will win the 
regulatory game , an element which is strongly connected to the degree of political 
power of the participating SIGs. 
Curiously, at the time these theories were being developed, a process of deregulation 
all over the world set in. As a result of this deregulation movement taking place in the 
last three decades, many economists concluded that positive theory is of limited 
importance and has little explanatory power. This idea was picked up by Keeler, who 
argued that positive theory can allow for deregulation. Keeler (Keeler, 1984) combined 
elements of both positive economic models described above (by using the consumer 
surplus of more than one SIG) with normative economic elements (by using a social 
welfare function). Although from the modelling point of view Keeler’s idea needed to 
be improved, in many cases modern positive economic literature is based on the simple 
insight that the implemented policy is a mix of normative and positive policy elements. 
Modern theory of political economy focuses on elections, the provision of information 
and campaign contributions as the main fields in which SIGs concentrate their activities 
of interfering in the political process. 
Grossman and Helpman (2000) formalized Keeler’s main axiom so that the adopted 
policy package incorporates both normative and positive policy elements more fully. 
Their research concentrates on political interaction between policy-makers and interest 
groups. Using advanced game theoretical methods Grossman and Helpmann showed 
that SIGs will “educate” voters in the pre-election period, will provide credible 
information to policy-makers and will make contributions to politicians and parties in 
order to achieve their favourite policy set. On the other hand policy makers will select 
those SIGs which are most valuable to them, and will maximize their probability to get 
re-elected. This causes decision makers only to deviate from their personally most 
favoured optimal policy set, if they receive enough campaign contributions without 
worsening their re-election chances. 
All these presented models have in common that they attempt to describe the 
decision-making process under the influence of special interest groups. Although 
methodically different, the outcome of the models is a set of policies, selected by the 
decision-maker, containing the element of compromise. Since the transport sector is a 
traditionally highly regulated sector, this kind of analysis could be applied to transport 
markets. In all transport modes there are major or minor SIGs trying to interfere with 
the political process (e.g. drivers associations, environmental organisations, airline and 
airport associations etc). The first implication from the positive theory point of view is 
that in transport markets SIGs will try to interfere with the political process of decision-
making to achieve the best outcome for their members. Naturally SIGs and also 
regulators prefer regulation. However, a simple regulation of transport markets is 
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usually not possible. First, nowadays, it is difficult to impose apparent unnecessary 
regulations, because voters are much better informed than they used to be in the past. 
Second, in almost all cases in European transport there are at least two major SIGs with 
contrary interests intervening in the political game. Take for instance the construction of 
a new airport runway. Airport administration and (perhaps) airlines will certainly push 
the construction plans. In contrast, the inhabitants of neighbouring towns will oppose to 
these plans (due to noise pollution). Usually these inhabitants will be very successful in 
their opposition because of their ability to form an interest group quickly and efficiently. 
The outcome in many of the cases like the one just described is that the runway is 
constructed, but with substantial flight restrictions (e.g. night flights). This is exactly the 
element of compromise we mentioned above. 
These considerations have two major implications. First, in most of the cases a 
compromise will be the only way to achieve some degree of consensus among all 
participating actors. Second, powerful SIGs should find more subtle means than 
claiming the introduction of regulation in order to enhance the welfare of their 
members.  
One possibility to take the welfare of all (major) SIGs into account is the construction 
of infrastructure charging structures that reflect the interests of the participating SIGs. 
Price differentiation plays a major role here. On the one hand, additional differentiation 
can appease protests. On the other hand maximising social welfare and taking into 
account the interests of the involved (most powerful) SIG’s will also lead to additional 
differentiation. In the example above with the runway construction this would mean 
additional surcharges for night flights. 
It seems that up to now the “political economy aspect” of regulated tariffs has been 
addressed rarely in the literature. Laffont/Tirole (Laffont and Tirole, 2000) emphasised 
the danger of political manipulation of Ramsey pricing, if (positive) externalities are to 
be included in the Ramsey formula. The most important contribution up to now seems 
to be a formal model in which Laffont (2000) compared the Smith pricing rule with an 
optional tariff in terms of expected welfare in a scenario where two SIGs alternate in 
power with a certain probability. He arrives at the surprising result that the inclusion of 
political distortions by SIGs can lead to superiority of the Smith rule. 
In a subsequent section this analysis will be applied to the empirical evidence 
concerning the effects of lobbying for price differentiation. 
 
 
3. Case studies 
 
The previous section discussed the theoretical backgrounds of price differentiation in 
transport. It not only gives us a better understanding of the concept, it also allows us to 
identify important aspects for the assessment of the case studies. Various elements have 
been identified that may be relevant for the success or failure of a particular case study 
where price differentiation is implemented in practice. 
In this section we will provide a summary overview of the case studies carried out in 
the DIFFERENT project. We will also briefly address the methodology used for data 
collection and define indicators to be used in our cross case analysis carried out in the 
next section where we test the hypotheses. 
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In order to collect data from the case studies in a generic way, a factsheet form was 
designed. The fact sheet consisted of the main dimensions relevant to price 
differentiation. The aim is to provide common ground for the comparison of outcomes 
of the case studies, for example in terms of testing hypotheses on differentiated pricing. 
The complete factsheet design is documented in the project report. 
 
3.1. Generalities 
 
In this section we provide an overview of the case studies based on the information 
collected through the factsheets. Factsheet data were provided for 27 case studies (see 
table 1). In our discussion we consider five different types of differentiated 
infrastructure charging case studies: 
 
- Airlines (5) 
- Shipping (8) 
- Railways (4) 
- Road haulage (4) 
- Car drivers (6) 
 
The case studies are spread over in all EU-countries plus Switzerland and Norway. 
The wide geographic scope together with the various user types leads to a 
heterogeneous collection of case studies. 
The information collected is not fully homogenous. For three case studies the 
factsheet was completed only partially. We will nevertheless include the available 
information from these three cases in our analysis. On the other hand, for one case study 
two factsheets were completed, one for passenger and one for freight transport. We will 
consider them as separate cases in the subsequent analysis. 
Throughout our analysis the number of case studies considered may vary as a result of 
both the heterogeneous character of the information collected as well as the inherently 
heterogeneous character of the different case studies. This will be discussed in a 
subsequent section. 
Whereas in our discussion most attention will be paid to answers that fit in the 
predefined answering alternatives of the factsheet form, we will report on other 
dimensions where appropriate. 
 
3.2. Objectives of the price setting agents 
 
Cost coverage is the most cited objective for price differentiation, closely followed by 
efficiency and environment (figure 2). Legislative requirements and safety are 
considered as an objective in relatively few cases. If we consider different case study 
types, we observe that the overall ranking broadly holds for the individual types, be it 
with some noteworthy exceptions. 
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Figure 2: Main Objectives of Price Differentiation. 
 
Safety and competitiveness are considered only by port cases. Especially for safety 
this seems odd, given the important safety problems in road traffic. Port cases do 
generally not consider congestion, which probably fits the specific situation where 
congestion is a relatively small or even non-existent problem. 
One surprising observation in railway cases is that in only one case environmental 
objectives are represented in setting differentiated prices. Given the choice that 
operators generally have between old, unregulated and heavily polluting diesel powered 
rolling stock or clean electrical ones, there certainly would be a case for environmental 
incentives in the price schedule. 
The car drivers’ cases tend to focus on congestion, pay more than average attention to 
acceptability and any cost coverage objective is absent. This seems to fit the 
stereotypically setting of a congestion charge. 
The average number of objectives per case is about the same for road and rail cases, 
but is larger for shipping cases and smaller for airport cases. Obviously, the large 
variance in the number of objectives should have its impact on the corresponding 
differentiated pricing schemes. In order to have a measure for the number of objectives 
addressed in the case study, we define the degree of ambition, which is simply the 
number of objectives reported (see table 1). 
 
3.3. Dimensions of price differentiation 
 
We will first have a look at the behavioural dimensions along which price 
differentiation is considered in the case studies. In a next step we will introduce an 
indicator for price differentiation and discuss the application of this indicator to the case 
study data. 
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Figure 3: Types of Differentiation. 
 
The most often cited dimensions of price differentiation are: type of vehicle, type of 
user, size of vehicle and time of travel (figure 3). At the other side of the spectrum we 
find the dimensions: load factor (or occupancy rate in passenger transport) and type of 
fuel. 
Looking at oddities in the occurrence of differentiation dimensions, we observe that 
cargo type and activity level are only used for price differentiation in port cases. The 
differentiation along activity level obviously stems from the negotiable character of port 
prices. As for cargo type, it may both depend on costs related to handling or differences 
in demand elasticities (or willingness to pay). 
Payload related price differentiation (load factor for freight, occupancy rate for 
passengers) is limited to freight transport only. The motivations for such a 
differentiation are not very clear, given that most (internal and external) infrastructure 
use costs are function of the vehicle rather than its load. But it deserves to be noted that 
occupancy rate infrastructure use differentiation does exist in the form of carpool lanes, 
locally known as diamond lanes or high-occupancy vehicle lanes, and ubiquitous in 
many larger US urban areas. 
The relative absence of fuel type differentiation may be explained by prices already 
being differentiated in the reference case (road transport) or most vehicles using the 
same fuel (air transport). It should however be noted that existing differentiations in fuel 
taxes usually do not correlate to differences in external costs. This would justify further 
research on fuel price differentiation. 
Airline cases typically focus on time of travel (day versus night), probably with the 
intention to alleviate airport congestion or to abate noise pollution. 
Road haulage cases somewhat surprisingly do not differentiate as a function of time 
of travel. Differentiation along type of user is the most often reported dimension in car 
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driver cases. The underlying dynamic is that these urban congestion charge case studies 
typically feature a myriad of user classes which are exempt from the charge. Where 
differentiation along user class exists in non-road cases, this is motivated by demand 
based arguments (elasticities, willingness-to-pay). 
As with the number of objectives per case study, we also observe a larger than 
average number of differentiation dimensions for the seaport cases, whereas airlines and 
urban congestion charge schemes typically feature a smaller than average number of 
pricing dimensions, the latter probably explained by the inclusion of the Spitsmijden 
experimental scheme. 
A simple measure for degree of differentiation would be to count the number of 
dimensions along which price differentiation is proposed. However, such a measure 
would classify two schedules with a different number of price levels along the same 
number of dimensions as equally differentiated. Intuition suggests that this is typically 
not what we are aiming at. 
To account for the number of price levels along each dimension, we first look at a 
fictitious schedule that is differentiated along one dimension. The minimum number of 
price levels is one (provided that zero is also a level), in which case the schedule is not 
differentiated and the indicator should reach a minimum level. The maximum number 
of price levels is infinite (in the case of the price being a continuous function of the 
behavioural dimension), in which case the indicator should reach a maximum level. We 
normalise minimum level to zero and maximum level to unity. 
We still need to determine the functional form between both extreme points. Intuition 
tells us that the first additional price level (i.e. from one to two price levels) adds more 
to the degree of differentiation than let us say the 999th.We therefore want a functional 
form that is concave over the interval considered. Furthermore, we learn from literature 
on time optimal congestion charging (cfr. discussion in Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 
1993) that about half of the maximum welfare gain is obtainable with the simplest case 
of a differentiated charge (i.e. two levels). 
The simplest functional form that fulfils the requirements set out above (extreme 
points, convex, half the maximum value at two levels) is 1-1/n with n the number of 
price levels. 
To aggregate the values along the individual dimensions we simply add them up 
(hence our choice to normalise the minimum level to zero). This is a rather coarse 
approach. Not only do we assume that differentiation along the different dimensions is 
equally important, moreover we assume that the different dimensions are not correlated, 
which is highly unlikely e.g. for fuel and vehicle type. 
With respect to the first point above we can only argue that this is the best we can get 
for a generic approach given the heterogeneity of case studies. With respect to the 
second point, it seems safe to assume that price schedules are not randomly defined and 
that any price setting agent will refrain from schedules that introduce cognitive burden 
by pricing along heavily correlated dimensions.2 
The resulting indicator for degree of differentiation is presented in table 1. 
                                                 
2
 Provided the limitations that are identified with respect to corelation and other issues and that apply to 
both the indicator for degree of ambition and degree of differentiation, it would be an interesting 
excercise to test for different specifications of said indicators to assess the robustness of the conclusions 
drawn here. Unfortunately the dataset we use does not provide sufficient information to allow for 
alternative (and potentially more refined) specifications to be established. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 4-34 
 17 
Table 1: List of case studies. 
Name of Case Study Case Study 
Type 
Degree of 
Ambition 
Degree of 
Differentiation 
Port of Amsterdam shipping 6 6,6 
Port of Hamburg shipping 7 5,1 
Port of Gothenburg shipping 6 5,0 
Lerwick - Shetland Islands shipping 5 4,4 
Port of Valencia shipping 10 4,4 
Port of Duisburg - (Duisport) shipping 4 3,5 
France rail infra charge railways 8 3,0 
Trondheim road charge car drivers 3 3,0 
Scalloway, Shetland Islands shipping 5 3,0 
Effects of differentiated charges at 
Airpot Hamburg airlines 1 2,7 
German Railways railways 4 2,4 
Stockholm City car drivers 7 2,2 
London City Centre car drivers 5 2,2 
The German HGV Toll road haulage 4 2,2 
Edinburgh road pricing car drivers 6 2,0 
Brenner TEN-T (freight) road haulage 5 1,9 
Brenner TEN-T (passenger) road haulage 5 1,8 
Swiss Heavy Vehicle Fee (HVF) road haulage 3 1,7 
Sullom Voe, Shetland Islands shipping 5 1,6 
Ljubljana Airport Case Study airlines 3 1,2 
Rail infrastructure charges in Austria railways 2 1,2 
Spitsmijden car drivers 3 0,7 
London airports airlines 3  
Madrid Barajas Airport airlines 2  
Rail infrastructure charges in Britain railways 2  
Gran Canaria Airport airlines 2  
Rome road pricing car drivers 1  
 
With the exception of the Brenner cases all entries in table 1 for which a degree of 
differentiation is provided, concern real world implementations. For a number of cases 
we did not assess the degree of differentiation. This was either because sufficient 
information was lacking or because the setup of the case study did not allow for the 
calculation of an unambiguous value, especially where the case study focused on 
simulating an extended number of schemes. 
We observe that the port cases typically carry a lot of price differentiation (with the 
exception of Sullom Voe). At the other end of the spectrum is the Spitsmijden case 
which concerns a limited time scientific experiment: in such a setting one typically 
wants to focus on a concise number of influences hence the low level of differentiation. 
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Urban congestion schemes (i.e. “car driver” in the table) typically feature an 
intermediate level of differentiation. While this may seem counterintuitive given the 
need to avoid cognitive burden, these schemes typically carry a number of excepted user 
classes which adds to the degree of differentiation. 
There is no clear reason why shipping cases should carry more differentiation than 
e.g. road haulage cases. The figures do however suggest that there is much 
heterogeneity in price setting practise across the different transport modes. There seems 
to be no obvious difference in differentiation between freight and passenger transport 
cases (note that railway infrastructure pricing concerns both). 
 
 
4. Hypotheses 
 
In this section we use the theoretical framework presented above as a base to define 
hypotheses with respect to infrastructure price differentiation practise, and proceed to a 
cross-case testing of these hypotheses. 
In the setting of this paper we will limit the discussion to a selection of hypotheses 
that proved to be insightful. For a full overview of all hypotheses tested we refer to the 
project report (Knockaert et al., 2008). 
In the formulation of the hypotheses we focus on two research questions: 
 
- What explains the adoption of certain differentiated price structures? 
- What are the consequences of differentiated prices for travel behaviour, welfare 
and acceptance? 
 
In a first subsection we will present and test the hypotheses related to normative 
economics. In a subsequent subsection the focus will be on the hypotheses stemming 
from positive economics. 
 
4.1. Normative Economics 
 
For each of the research questions formulated we first present a general hypothesis. In 
a next step we present a number of specific hypotheses based on the corresponding 
general hypothesis. Each hypothesis is discussed with respect to the theoretical 
framework and subsequently tested for using the case study information. 
 
General hypothesis A The degree of price differentiation adopted by a certain actor 
depends on factors such as the aims of actors setting the prices (infrastructure managers, 
transport companies, governments), demand parameters and cost structure. 
 
The first general hypothesis addresses the determinants of the choice for differentiated 
price structures. We will discuss two specific hypotheses: one considering the role of 
aims of the price setting agents, and one considering the role of cost structures in price 
setting. Specific hypotheses on the role of the demand side in price setting were also 
formulated, but testing them proved not to be clarifying so we do not discuss them here. 
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Specific hypothesis A-1 The degree of differentiation of pricing schemes increases 
with the ambition of price setting actors. 
 
We observe a large variance in the number of objectives or degree of ambition across 
the case studies. In order to optimise a pricing scheme for a given number of objectives 
(assumed to be independent), one needs to tune a number of (independent) pricing 
dimensions that is (at least) the same. 
In figure 4 the relation between degree of ambition and degree of differentiation is 
plotted. The positive relation suggested by the hypothesis is confirmed by the trend 
reflected in the figure. 
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
tio
n
ambition
Differentiation Ambition
airlines
shipping
railways
road haulage
car drivers
 
Figure 4: Degree of differentiation versus degree of ambition. 
 
While the hypothesis is motivated by basic mathematical evidence rather than specific 
economic theory, we use it as a starting point since the revealed relationship will prove 
to be very useful in controlling for heterogeneity in degree of ambition in our further 
analysis. 
 
Specific hypothesis A-2 The higher price setting actors value equity considerations, 
the more they will be inclined to apply price differentiation, where users that deserve 
support from an equity perspective will be confronted with lower charges than other 
users. 
 
Different user categories will be confronted with different charge levels simply 
because differentiation across user types is applied, or because pricing is differentiated 
across a variable that is correlated with user type. 
The hypothesis closely follows our definition of vertical equity. We conduct a 
qualitative comparison between the equity objective in the case study and the users 
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which are exempt from or being favoured by the scheme. We consider the following 
types of user support: favouring frequent users, users that live in a geographically 
confined area and handicapped users. 
Across all types of cases where equity is an objective, we find that frequent users tend 
to be favoured. It is unclear from an equity perspective why frequent users should 
deserve support (there may be some degree of correlation). 
Another type of user that is favoured under equity considerations, are users that live in 
a geographically confined area. In passenger transport cases, this mostly corresponds to 
the political influence of these users (but again there may or may not be correlation with 
equity). In the other cases, where freight transport companies pay the charge, we mostly 
observe protectionism tendencies in the favoured user types. 
A last type of user being favoured in all equity driven car driver cases are 
handicapped users. This is a category that, from a (vertical) equity perspective, should 
deserve support  
To summarise we conclude that the hypothesis is confirmed in private car driver 
cases. In other cases where companies pay the charge, equity motivation may be a 
disguise for protectionism tendencies. 
 
Specific hypothesis A-3 When the costs of price differentiated charging mechanisms 
are high for the price setting agents, they will choose simple (cheaper) charging 
mechanisms as second best strategies. 
 
The idea behind the hypothesis is that the costs of an upgraded charging mechanism 
are prohibitive compared to the expected (social) benefits by the larger degree of 
differentiation. The studied relationship is plotted in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: The charging mechanism as a barrier towards further differentiation. 
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Although one may expect the hypothesis to implicitly assume a constant degree of 
ambition, it may well be that price setting actors moderate their ambition when faced 
with the limitations of an existing charging mechanism. We should hence check for the 
degree of differentiation independently from ambition. We then observe that the cases 
where the mechanism is a barrier tend to the bottom of the differentiation spectrum. 
We therefore conclude that the case study data is in line with the hypothesis. 
 
General hypothesis B The degree of differentiation of transport prices has an effect 
on user responses in terms of travel behaviour (for example modal choice, trip 
generation, temporal choice) resulting in changes in transport flows, the efficiency of 
the pricing measures and the level of acceptance of these measures. 
 
The second general hypothesis addresses the consequences of differentiated pricing. 
Again will we discuss a selection of three specific hypotheses. Other hypotheses can be 
found in the project report (Knockaert et al., 2008). 
 
Specific hypothesis B-1 Effectiveness of a price measure increases with the level of 
differentiation, but above a certain level, the effectiveness stabilises or may even 
decrease. The negative counter effect is stronger for individuals (e.g. car drivers) paying 
the charge than for companies (e.g. rail freight operators). And it is stronger for frequent 
users than for infrequent users. 
 
The initial increase in effectiveness as a function of degree of differentiation is a 
direct result from convergence towards the first best optimal pricing schedule for which 
effectiveness reaches its maximum level by definition. 
 
 
Figure 6: The relationship between degree of differentiation and effectiveness. 
 
As we stated earlier, in order to realise a given number of (independent) objectives, 
one needs to differentiate prices along (at least) the same number of (independent) 
behavioural dimensions. This is mathematically determined. As such, the initial increase 
effectiveness 
degree of differentiation 
real world cases are expected to feature a 
degree of differentiation that corresponds to a 
high levels of effectiveness. 
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in effectiveness is dependent on the degree of ambition (i.e. the number of objectives to 
fulfil). For a smaller number of objectives, the initial increase will be stronger and reach 
the (first best determined) maximum value for effectiveness earlier than with a larger 
number of objectives. 
The intuition behind the expected decrease in effectiveness is based on the various 
decision making costs users incur due to differentiation. These decision making costs 
are likely to increase as an exponential function of the differentiation level and 
independently from the degree of ambition. 
We expect the negative counter effect to be mitigated to some extent by companies as 
they have more opportunities to invest in expertise with respect to dealing with a larger 
degree of differentiation. Frequent users at the other hand can build up experience with 
the scheme and are hence expected to have smaller marginal decision making costs than 
infrequent users. Although there probably is some correlation between both 
categorisations, companies are likely to be more frequent users than individuals. 
A way to test the hypothesis would be to compare degrees of ambition and 
differentiation to the impact of the charge. Only a limited number of cases have an 
impact that is not or only partially in accordance with the aims set. Failure to meet the 
objectives is in some of these cases attributed to lobbying, which is clearly not what we 
are looking for here. 
Considering the fact that most cases are real world pricing schemes, it seems safe to 
assume that they are designed to be (close to) optimal. As we have already seen in 
comparing the observed degree of ambition to the observed degree of differentiation, 
there seems to be a relation (figure 6). This relation indicates that a given degree of 
ambition corresponds to an optimal level of differentiation, which is basically what the 
hypothesis poses. 
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Figure 7: Case studies for which the impact of the charging scheme is reported to be in accordance with 
the aims set. 
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By redrawing the relationship between differentiation and ambition and limiting to the 
cases that have an impact in accordance to the aims set, the picture even becomes 
clearer (see figure 7). For smaller levels of ambition the optimal level of differentiation 
increases with ambition. For larger levels, the increase becomes smaller, which is an 
indication that the decision making costs play a role. And for a given level of ambition, 
the optimal level of differentiation is smaller for car drivers than for companies. 
We therefore consider the case study data to be in line with the hypothesis. 
 
Specific hypothesis A-2 When price differentiation takes place in a certain domain 
(for example time differentiated tolls), the strongest behavioural response takes place 
within the same domain (change in departure time). Effects in other domains tend to be 
smaller. 
 
The basic assumption behind the hypothesis is that consumers try to optimise their 
behaviour in such a way that maximum utility is obtained with minimum effort. In 
reaction to a differentiated infrastructure price schedule, the traveller will try to mitigate 
the pricing impact while minimising the discomfort of behavioural adaptations. 
The hypothesis then basically states that the easiest way to adapt behavioural activity 
along a given dimension is primarily to change behaviour along that same dimension 
and minimise efforts along other dimensions. 
The setting in which the hypothesis is formulated is rather artificial as compared to 
the reality of the case studies: most case studies carry differentiation along different 
dimensions and many case studies do not provide information on the relative 
importance of the different behavioural reactions (and neither on the ranking of the 
price differentiation dimensions). 
Moreover, the link between behavioural reactions and pricing dimensions is not 
always unique. Especially with respect to spatial differentiation, many pricing 
dimensions (place, infrastructure) are connected with many behavioural domains 
(routing, destination, location). 
In the case studies, the most often reported reaction to time differentiation is a change 
in trip timing. The example provided in the hypothesis is confirmed here. 
Differentiation of infrastructure prices along spatial dimensions (place, infrastructure) 
is mainly linked to route choice behavioural responses. Again, this is in line with the 
hypothesis. 
Price differentiation based on vehicle technology is somewhat surprisingly linked to 
route choice responses. That seems somewhat pointless. This is in part explained by 
cases where a combination of vehicle technology and spatial dimensions is used for 
price differentiation. There are however a number of cases where route change is 
reported to be an important user reaction whereas no spatial differentiation dimension is 
reported. It is our guess that the user reaction considered relates to route changes of trips 
to infrastructure outside the geographical area to which the differentiated pricing 
scheme is confined. This guess is in line with the observation that route change seems 
generally over-represented in the user responses reported by the case studies. 
Abstracting from the route choice issue discussed above, we observe that the second 
most reported user response to differentiation along vehicle technology dimensions 
(size, type, fuel) is choice of vehicle technology related domains. It should be noted 
here that the different dimensions considered (size, type, fuel) are heavily correlated. As 
such, the hypothesis seems to be confirmed again. 
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Given the earlier discussed heterogeneity between case studies as well as the caveats 
related to the real world setting of most cases, we consider the case study findings to be 
a confirmation of the hypothesis. 
 
Specific hypothesis B-3 In the case of equity oriented pricing policies, the level of 
acceptance of pricing schemes increases with the degree of differentiation. 
 
Although not stated explicitly, this hypothesis assumes a constant degree of ambition. 
In order to check the hypothesis against the case study information, we select the 
cases where equity is an objective, which report on acceptability and in which a value is 
available for the degree of differentiation and ambition. The resulting subset consists of 
ten case studies, which we plotted in figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Acceptability in cases where equity is an objective (rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 
very unacceptable and 5 meaning very acceptable). 
 
Although not very sharp, there is an indication that the cases with a lower level of 
acceptability (two or three on a scale from one to five) correspond to lower levels of 
degree of differentiation. The higher level of acceptability (four) occurs with all levels 
of degree of differentiation. 
Although the information used is somewhat limited in scope, it does seem to fit in 
with the hypothesis. 
 
4.2. Positive economics 
 
In the theoretical section, we formulated the conjecture that in reality transport prices 
are to a large extent the result of political compromises. In the following we shall try to 
show in more detail how the various pricing schemes that have been developed in 
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normative price theory can easily be manipulated by politicians and interest groups. We 
will now substantiate the discussion by means of empirical findings from the 
DIFFERENT project. 
In our discussion of the topic we first elaborate on practical implications of the 
positive economics’ theoretic framework. These findings will result in two hypotheses 
which will subsequently be tested by using the case study dataset. 
 
Practical implications 
 
We shall first start with cost based pricing structures (marginal cost pricing and fully 
distributed cost pricing) and then move on to demand based pricing structures (Ramsey 
pricing, multipart tariffs). 
Starting with marginal cost pricing, it is clear that –when applied consistently- this 
pricing principle would result in very finely differentiated and very complex charges. It 
is this very postulate of maximum differentiation which opens the door for SIGs to 
intervene and manipulate the pricing structure. This assertion, however, is too coarse 
and needs to be refined. The finally implemented tariff structure will depend on the 
relative political power3 of the various SIGs. If a highly differentiated pricing scheme 
leads to substantial increases of expenses for the members of a certain (powerful) SIG, 
it will depend on its relative political power whether this pricing scheme will be 
implemented or not. A simple example of this case could be HGV tolls. A high degree 
of differentiation between private cars and heavy goods vehicles would most likely 
translate into higher bills for truckers. Private car drivers would favour a very 
differentiated pricing scheme for truckers and a less differentiated and lower price 
structure for themselves. (In Germany the current toll for private cars on motorways is 
even zero.) In that way they could shift the major part of infrastructure financing to 
hauliers. If, however, in this situation truckers are more effective in lobbying, or if the 
HGV manufacturing industry is important for policy-makers, the tariff structure which 
is finally implemented will be less differentiated than private car users would want it to 
be. 
Fully distributed cost tariffs, once implemented, are (as shown by Laffont 2000) less 
amenable to political manipulation than marginal cost prices. On this basis one would 
expect that the activity of SIGs will be directed more towards manipulating the cost 
calculation method. It can be expected, for instance, that SIGs will debate the costing 
methodology (accounting based vs. pure economical methods), the allowed rate of 
return as well as the degree of detail of the cost calculation. This too can result in a 
higher degree of price differentiation. 
A recent example are the developments of the German HGV toll: a more detailed cost 
calculation led to a marginally higher tolling level.4 
Sometimes pricing schemes based on Fully Distributed Costs are amplified by 
incentive compatible pricing elements. Again, the German HGV toll may serve as an 
example. The charging structure incorporates reductions and penalties for the use of 
environmentally friendly vehicles.5 This led to a much higher degree of differentiation 
                                                 
3
 Political power of an interest group can be defined first in terms of voting power (e.g. the number of 
members of the SIG), or in terms of financial power (e.g. the wealth of the single members of the SIG). 
4
 The new calculation method was developed by IWW/Infras. The calculation reports infrastructure costs 
of HGV at one cent higher than in the original calculation of 2002. 
5
 This calculation was made by means of a toxicity comparison method of the respective emission classes. 
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than the pure FDC methodology for the allocation of infrastructure cost would have 
implied. The winners of the new charging structure (effective from the beginning of 
January 2009) are the German hauliers, who in most of the cases use governmental 
subsidies to purchase environmental friendly vehicles and therefore pay a lower 
effective charge, which gives them a relative competitive advantage compared to 
foreign hauliers. 
In contrast to cost based pricing schemes, demand based charging structures take 
differences in the behavioural patterns of the infrastructure users as a point of departure. 
Let us begin with Ramsey pricing. Ramsey pricing takes price elasticities of user 
groups into account. The traditional principle of “value of service pricing” scheme of 
railroads may be interpreted in this way: by charging higher tariffs for high value goods, 
railroads exploit the lower elasticity of demand of the corresponding shippers. But 
Ramsey pricing is applied in other areas of transport too, although this may not be 
obvious at first glance. The reason for this apparent paradox lies in political influence. 
Political influence often results in the very opposite of the Ramsey principle that price 
should be higher for the inelastic demand. For example, in many European countries 
commuters can subtract a certain amount of money (based on the daily travelled 
distance) from their taxable income. Taking into account that commuters are in general 
less elastic in their travel behaviour than other travellers, this would seem to be more a 
case of inverse Ramsey pricing than of Ramsey pricing itself. Policy makers usually 
justify inverse Ramsey pricing with positive externalities (e.g. welfare effects of 
commuting mobility) as well as equity arguments. However commuters are also voters 
who are traditionally very well represented in the political process via automobile clubs 
and other organisations. Abolishing commuting subsidies would automatically decrease 
a politician’s re-election chances substantially. Germany, for instance, has just seen the 
re-introduction of commuting-subsidies after attempts to reduce them to a far lower 
level. 
In this case it is clear, that SIGs have taken advantage of their political power and 
achieved to impose differentiation in line with their interests. 
Examples like this seem to fit very well into the framework of positive economics. 
Since Ramsey pricing translates into different prices for different user groups it is very 
likely that the group paying the higher price will lobby in order to pay less. Keeping in 
mind that the policy-maker aims at re-election, politicians will try to avoid 
disadvantaging major SIGs. This means that, if disadvantaged user groups have high 
political power, policy makers will try to appease them in one way or another. The most 
likely way to do this is to create subgroups and impose additional price differentiation. 
From the perspective of positive economics, Ramsey pricing is therefore a policy which 
should be applied with caution, because it may invite interference of SIGs in the “wrong 
direction”. 
Another useful pricing scheme for transport could be peak-load pricing in situations 
where travel demand fluctuates predictably. For SIGs it is much more difficult to 
manipulate peak-load pricing, since peaks are clearly recognizable and therefore not 
manipulable. For this pricing scheme it is therefore to be expected, that disadvantaged 
SIGs will centre their activities at first on avoiding peak-load pricing altogether. This 
seems to be the case in air transport. In the very few situations were peak-load pricing 
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on airports was implemented (Schank, 2005), legacy carriers engaged in heavy and 
successful lobbying to remove it.6 
A further reaction of interest groups to peak-load pricing could be the attempt to 
influence the methodology of calculating marginal and capacity costs (see the case of 
FDC-pricing above). The peak-users would have an incentive to shift part of their 
capacity costs to the off-peak users. Commuters for instance would lobby in order to 
pay only the incremental infrastructure costs, or to exaggerate common costs with off-
peak users. 
Non-linear tariffs contain a fixed component (ideally reflecting the fixed costs) and at 
least one variable component (ideally reflecting marginal costs). Optional tariffs are a 
combination of at least two two-part tariffs, where the user can choose the one tariff 
fitting best to his/her preferences. Since users minimize their spending, they select a 
tariff according to their level of consumption. Therefore optional tariffs can also be seen 
as multipart tariffs. As stated in the theoretical section, Laffont’s results show that there 
are cases were political distortions make linear tariffs superior to optional tariffs. The 
reason for this result lies basically in the self-selection possibilities of SIGs to consume 
more or less than they would do in the welfare optimum and in that way to shift the 
financial burden to other users. In addition, a higher degree of differentiation of the 
variable components of the charge will multiply the possibilities of decision-makers to 
burden particularly weaker user groups.7 Another additional possibility for political 
influence related to non-linear tariffs, is the possibility to change the proportions 
between the fixed and the variable proportions of the charge. Take for instance airport 
pricing: the typical charge on European airports consists of a fixed charge (determined 
by MTOW) and a variable charge (determined by the number of passengers). Legacy 
carriers favour a regime that contains only variable charges for two reasons: First, 
paying only a price per passenger implies that risks resulting from demand fluctuations 
are (partly) transferred to airports. Second, paying only a variable charge is in line with 
the business model of legacy carriers to capture the passenger’s time sensitivity, which 
translates into a high service frequency and relative small aircraft size. In contrast, low-
cost-carriers (LCC’s) prefer to pay one price per take-off or landing, rather than a price 
per passenger, since they usually fly with high load factors. As a result, it is very likely 
that LCC’s and legacy carriers will try to influence the pricing policy of airports with 
respect to the variable and fixed component of non-linear tariffs. The result again will 
depend upon the balance of political power. 
Summarising this section so far leads to the formulation of the following conjecture: 
 
General Hypothesis 1 The setting of infrastructure-tariffs is subject to a strong 
political element. The positive theory aspect of setting infrastructure charges is therefore 
                                                 
6
 In just one case lobbying did not succeed to oppose peak-pricing efficiently. This case refers to La 
Guardia airport in year 1968, which experienced after the introduction of peak-pricing a massive exit of 
regional airlines to Teterboro airport. 
7
 Laffont’s result applies to outputs which are end-products. In talking about infrastructure user charges 
we are, however, dealing with intermediate products. It is well known that for end-products non-linear 
tariffs are pareto-superior to linear tariffs (apart from marginal cost pricing). With respect to intermediate 
products this is not necessarily the case (Ordover and Panzar, 1982) Frequently economists overlook this 
difficulty and use the so called “Willig theorem” for intermediate goods too, such as transport 
infrastructure services. Nevertheless it is still an open question whether Laffont’s result applies to 
intermediate goods in the strict sense too. 
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highly relevant. Lobbying activities will be a major explanatory variable for the tariff 
structure that will finally be implemented. 
 
General Hypothesis 2 Policy makers will react to lobbying influences and implement 
a “SIG equilibrium” (“a compromise”). Infrastructure charges which correspond to such 
an equilibrium may be labelled as “politically acceptable”. This means that in reality 
cases where charges conform the “textbook model” of a certain pricing-scheme (like 
marginal cost pricing or Ramsey pricing) will be rare. In most cases this rules out tariff-
structures which increase the welfare (as compared to the status quo ante) of only one 
SIG, even if total welfare effects would be positive. 
 
Specific Hypotheses 
 
With respect to the finally implemented charging structure, our analysis shows that 
different pricing rules lead to different SIG behaviour regarding different transport 
modes. In order to generate testable hypotheses concerning the effects of SIG behaviour 
on the finally implemented tariff structure, a framework of very detailed and 
differentiated hypotheses would be necessary. For practical reasons however and due to 
the limited amount of existing data (see the previous section), we limit ourselves to the 
formulation of two rough hypotheses, which reflect the main ideas of the theoretical 
analysis above. As stated before, price differentiation plays an important role for SIGs 
and policy makers in most pricing rules. In almost all pricing rules the number of SIGs 
as well as the distribution of their political power will be decisive for the final policy 
outcome: 
 
Specific Hypothesis 1 The higher the number of participating SIGs and the more 
balanced the distribution of their political power, the higher the degree of differentiation 
of the charge. If the number of SIGs becomes very high, however, the situation will 
approximate a regime of polypolistic competition where no SIG will be able to wield a 
decisive influence on the political process. Therefore, in this case the predictions of 
positive theory will be identical with the predictions of normative theory. 
 
Corollary The smaller the number of participating SIGs and the more unbalanced the 
distribution of their political power, the lower the degree of differentiation of the 
charge. 
 
In the following we will present the empirical results from the case studies in order to 
test these two hypotheses. The first major finding is that in almost none of the case 
studies a clear “textbook” pricing rule can be found. Most charging structures mix cost 
and demand elements in an opaque way, without recognizing the initial pricing rule. But 
this is only a first hint of the influence of SIGs. To deal with this issue more deeply a 
type of Delphi study was conducted within the DIFFERENT group with the various 
partners of the project acting as experts for their country. 
The first goal was to identify the political dimensions of the pricing scheme. From the 
answers obtained, it is clearly recognisable that the political dimension plays a decisive 
role. In 87 percent of all case studies the political factor is recognised as a crucial factor 
in pricing issues. The range of the political dimensions covers all transport modes and 
all countries concerned. There is only one case in which there is clearly no political 
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dimension at all, namely the Spitsmijden case. However, this case is based on 
experimental design and therefore cannot give evidence of any political dimensions at 
all. The large share of case studies indicating political dimensions supports General 
Hypothesis 1 above. 
Turning to the issue of political acceptability, the picture obtained by the case studies 
is very similar to the one with respect to the relevance of the political dimensions. The 
vast majority of all case studies (77 percent) showed evidence of the relevance of 
political acceptability. It was also clearly observable that politically accepted charges 
can be found in all transport modes. Even though lobby activity does not lead to 
politically accepted charges in every single case study, it can be safely stated that lobby 
activity in most cases achieves political compromises and therefore results in politically 
accepted charges. Additionally, both findings conform to Corollary 1. A majority of 
cases shows the relevance of the political dimension in infrastructure charging. At the 
same time a vast majority of cases detects politically accepted charges (little complaints 
and therefore little ex post lobby activities). One may assume therefore, that these 
charges represent a SIG equilibrium. 
Given that political influence is important in setting infrastructure tariffs, it is also 
important to take a closer look at the type of actors who benefit from the price structure. 
The results were as expected. Infrastructure companies seem to be unambiguously the 
“losers” of the political game of setting infrastructure charges. In most of the cases (12 
out of 22) users were recognized as the beneficiaries of the charging structure. This 
result was expected, since in almost all European countries infrastructure users have 
well organized interest groups. For instance car drivers are organised in automobile 
clubs which do not only provide technical assistance but also intervene with transport 
policy. Their political influence seems to be very high due to campaigns and printed 
media. Also, particular shippers (mostly oil-industry related, like in the case studies on 
ports) are favoured by the price structure. Some shippers managed to form small but 
very effective interest groups and therefore are in the position to keep the free rider 
problem under control. This means that shippers also have incentives to contribute to 
their lobby group in financial terms. With respect to the rest of the cases, results depend 
on the type of infrastructure analysed. Airport charges for instance are relevant for 
airlines and tour operators (as the major users). An interesting finding is that 
infrastructure companies do not seem to be able to establish their favoured tariff 
structure (see above). As privatisation progresses, infrastructure companies are expected 
to be the “winners” of the tariff-setting process (Betancor and Rendeiro, 2000) in more 
and more cases. Therefore, lobbying is expected to rise in the future. For the rest of the 
cases the picture was not clear enough since the researchers could not answer who 
benefits from the current tariff structure. Apparently, in these cases the political power 
was not clearly distributed and therefore no SIG could exclusively benefit from the 
tariff structure. This is an additional hint that the political balance of power is decisive 
for differentiation. In nine cases shifting of financial burden to other users was 
observed. 
Summarizing the empirical evidence so far, we conclude that lobby activities play a 
key role when designing tariff structures. In the vast majority of the cases concerned 
users of infrastructure facilities are favoured by the tariff structure. 
The next step is to link the degree of differentiation (as defined before) with lobbying 
activities and the political power of SIGs. Figure 9 depicts the first relation. The 
abscissa in this figure depicts the existence of lobbying activities (Yes/No) and the 
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ordinate depicts the degree of differentiation as defined above. The trend in this figure is 
clear: the degree of differentiation increases when lobby activities take place. However, 
the degree of differentiation has a relatively wide range. Hence, we can not safely 
conclude that the degree of differentiation increases with increasing lobbying activity 
per se. It is apparent that also other factors, such as voting power of the participating 
SIGs, play a key role. 
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Figure 9: Degree of differentiation and lobbying activities. Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
In order to account for at least one of these factors we included voting power in the 
analysis. To do this we plot the degree of differentiation against the three possible levels 
of political power (as indicated by the case study leaders). Figure 10 shows a 
differentiated picture: first, the low number of cases (two cases) with low political 
power of the respective SIG does not allow for drawing safe conclusions; second, if 
political power of the dominant SIG is high, the degree of differentiation tends to 
decrease. This can happen because only one SIG will prevail at the end and hence the 
finally implemented charge will reflect the welfare of the members of this particular 
SIG; third, if political power of SIGs is medium, it can be safely stated that more than 
one SIG is active. In this case, decision makers will take into account the welfare of the 
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most powerful ones. Thus, the degree of differentiation tends to be higher than in all 
other cases. 
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Figure 10: Degree of differentiation and political power. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
At this point it has to be stated that the limited number of cases does not allow a test 
for each single pricing rule as described above. Additionally, the balance of political 
power is different in each single transport mode. In air transport for instance legacy 
carriers traditionally have much more political power than low cost carriers. Finally, in 
each transport mode there are different parameters defining the activities of interest 
groups. The degree of competition in the market, or the nature of regulation are two 
prominent examples of this. However, these first results give a safe impression on the 
outcome of the political process, when designing infrastructure charges. 
With respect to the impact of lobbying in terms of overall welfare effects, it is 
difficult at this stage to draw safe conclusions. If only one major SIG prevails (as figure 
10 shows), the degree of differentiation of the charge decreases, apparently below the 
optimal level. In contrary, if more than one SIG interacts in the political game, the 
degree of differentiation increases, apparently above the optimal level. In both cases 
welfare losses take place (see also specific hypothesis B-1 of the normative economics 
framework). These welfare losses are increased by transaction costs of organizing and 
running an SIG. Safe conclusions can however only be drawn if the optimal level of 
price differentiation is clearly defined. Defining this optimal level needs further 
research. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In our analysis we covered a broad range of topics on infrastructure charge 
differentiation. Two strands of economic theory were explored: the positive and the 
normative economics approach. It was argued that both theoretical frameworks are not 
mutually exclusive: positive theory describes how policy makers maximise their 
personal utility but at the same time take into account normative elements such as 
general welfare. 
An analysis of the practise of differentiated infrastructure pricing was conducted on a 
set of case studies. The case studies covered an extended scope of infrastructure and 
user types and hence carried much heterogeneity. To allow for a cross case analysis, it 
was necessary to somehow control for this heterogeneity. Two generic indicators were 
introduced. The first one captured the degree of ambition and was used in the analysis 
as a variable to control for heterogeneity in the aims of price setting actors. A second 
indicator captured the degree of price differentiation and proved to be useful as a 
dependent variable in our analysis of the charging schemes. 
As for the impact of the aims of price setting actors, we revealed that a higher level of 
ambition relates to a higher degree of differentiation. While the described relationship is 
straightforward, it supports our use of the degree of ambition as a proxy for case study 
heterogeneity. 
Furthermore we showed that the actual charging mechanisms may pose a practical 
barrier towards more differentiation where a degree of differentiation is observed that is 
lower than expected for a given level of ambition. 
If we look at the relationship of the degree of differentiation and effectiveness, we 
observe that in practise the decision costs play a role in reducing the optimal level of 
differentiation for higher levels of ambition. This effect is stronger for car drivers than 
for companies paying the charge. 
The cross case study analysis made clear that user reactions are expected to occur in 
behavioural domains that directly correspond to the dimensions of the pricing 
differentiation. While again this may sound trivial, this has important practical 
implications with respect to potential effectiveness and efficiency of pricing schemes 
that focus on charge differentiation across dimensions that depart from the intended 
behavioural change. 
The analysis revealed that equity objectives can influence differentiated pricing 
schemes in many ways. The impact of the normative theoretical framework is 
confirmed by the observation that a higher value given to equity considerations (by 
price setting actors) results in lower charges for private car users that deserve support 
from an equity point of view. But in cases where companies are paying the 
infrastructure charge, protectionist tendencies seem to have a larger explanatory power 
for the distinction between the favoured users and the non-favoured ones. In this case, 
the positive theoretical framework describes how a powerful SIG can manipulate a 
scheme that is based on equity objectives. 
Furthermore, we observe that a higher degree of differentiation increases the 
acceptability in equity oriented cases. While again the relationship can be explained 
from a normative point of view, relating a higher level of political acceptability to 
lobbying of SIGs which result in a higher degree of differentiation can also be explained 
by the positive theory. 
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The positive economics framework implies that different pricing schemes result in 
different manipulation possibilities by SIGs. Qualitative analysis showed that 
variabilisation is a major issue in air transport, whereas inverse Ramsey pricing is likely 
to play a role in city tolling systems and a more differentiated two part tariff in the 
shipping sector. 
The case studies further indicate that lobby activities are a major explanatory variable 
for the differentiated charging structure. Moreover, political acceptability of a certain 
pricing scheme can only be achieved if the most powerful SIGs do not object. As a 
result, the actual tariff structure reflects the political power of the SIGs. Whereas the 
presence of a larger number of SIGs (with a smaller amount of political power each) 
necessitates for a brokered compromise that carries much differentiation, a single 
powerful SIG may overrule the other SIGs in the lobbying process and hence allow for 
a political compromise on a less differentiated scheme. 
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